87 Days to Go
Think of it: The United Palestinian Emirates

By Sherwin Pomerantz

In 87 days the United Nations General Assembly’s 2011 session will open in New York, and unless thwarted in the interim, there will be a vote on recognizing Palestinian statehood. At this point in time it looks as if it will pass if it comes to the floor.

Last night, in the interests of hearing an alternative viewpoint, I attended a symposium presented by people who believe that should the vote be in favor of unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood, the next steps by Israel should be declaring Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria (what is often referred to as the West Bank).

The speakers were well prepared, informed and articulate and in the interests of space I would summarize their points in support of this approach as follows:

• This is a serious alternative that should not be summarily dismissed.
• The argument that the resultant demographics would be a disaster for Israel is not supported by existing studies because, for the most part, they are not credible and fly in the face of standard procedures applied to census taking.
• The Palestinian leadership’s constant rejection of partition, dating back to 1947, and many times thereafter, means that after always refusing that option, it is simply no longer an alternative and should be taken off the table.
• The concept of “winner takes all” does not apply to only one combatant in a conflict between two sides. Had the Arabs won in ’48, ’67, ’73, ’06, etc., they would have claimed sovereignty over all of the land, so why doesn’t that benefit inure to Israel as the winner in all of those engagements?

As always in these discussions, the chasm between theory and application is what makes the decision difficult, if not impossible. The discussants chose not to deal with the practicalities that would have to be addressed as a result of such a decision but chose, instead, to indicate that when Israel did this earlier with the Golan Heights and Jerusalem, while there was opposition among world leaders, in effect, nothing terrible happened as a result. Of course, to assume that this would be the case in 2011 as well is a bit of a jump, but the assumption was there nonetheless. As well, no one discussed what Israel would then do if it found itself, once again, dealing with a minority population that was 1/3 Arab.

The audience, composed primarily of Jerusalemites, mostly religious and originally from Anglo-Saxon countries, was, as expected, supportive of the concept. Never mind the details or what might happen here the day after such a declaration.

But there was one presentation that was more intriguing and seemingly more practical (if one can say that) than all of the others and that was made by Dr. Mordecai Kedar, of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University and who has 25 years of military intelligence experience in the Israel Defense Forces dealing with Arab politics and related subjects. (http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/mordechai_kedar.html)

His thesis is that Judea and Samaria is an area composed of Arab tribal groups which are centered in seven locations: Hebron, Jericho, Ramallah, Jenin, Nablus, Kalkilya and Tulkarem, each of which has their own customs, operational laws, hierarchy and traditions. He goes on to say that people from one area do not generally move within the West Bank to other areas and rarely intermarry as well.

Given this situation he suggests that these seven regional areas along with Gaza be made into something similar to the United Arab Emirates in the Gulf where each of the emirates are confederated under the flag of the UAE but retain their own individuality. In effect, he is suggesting creating the United Palestinian Emirates (UPE), if you will, but which, unlike the UAE, would not have its elemental parts contiguous to each other. Israel would, under this scenario, control all of the lands outside these eight regional areas which, for Judea and Samaria, would mean that none of the current settlements would need to be abandoned. As to the question of how people would travel, for example, from Ramallah to Jenin given that they would have to go through Israeli controlled territory to do so, Kedar sees this as a “technicality” that can be addressed. Certainly easier said than done.

Would that scenario work? Would the Palestinian Arab leadership accept such an approach? Is there openness on their side to consider an alternative to a contiguous land area? Would having a federated state of separate population enclaves, even with a seat at the UN as the UPE satisfy the craving for independence? Would any leader who agreed to this retain his life after the decision was made? Or would he be seen as having sold his people out to the “other?”

None of us have the answers. What we do know is that most Israelis want peace and are prepared to make sacrifices for it. What we also know is that most Israelis acknowledge that leaving areas formerly held by Israel such as Southern Lebanon and Gaza, has not brought quiet but rather regular attacks (although Southern Lebanon has been relatively quiet since the end of the 2nd Lebanese War). Most Israelis also agree that a Palestinian state on our borders controlling the hills of Judea and Samaria [and their dominance of both the coastal plain and the Jordan Valley] is a potential recipe for disaster. And yet, the majority of Israelis will also say that the only way to peace is two states for two people, side by side in peace and security. With all of these conflicting “givens” it is difficult to see a way out, but the status quo is also not very comforting.

What we need are leaders who understand the need for flexibility. Everett Dirksen, former US Congressman, Senator and later Minority Leader of the Senate, once said “I am a man of fixed and unbending principles, the first of which is to be flexible at all times.” He understood what leadership meant and, sadly, I fear those in power today simply do not understand this need.