Monday, February 14, 2011

Israel and Egypt

Israel and Egypt

For the past three weeks during the unfolding of the unrest in Egypt and other parts of the Arab World, I have intentionally not said anything publicly on the topic. I made that decision because things were simply moving too quickly to keep up with every development and even in this era of 24/7 news one would have had to dedicate every waking minute to following the information stream in order to keep on top of things.

What was interesting to me was that while I made that decision as a private citizen, it seemed that diplomatic departments in every government worldwide were also faced with the same problem. For example, the United States staked out an early position to dump Egyptian President Mubarak and in the words of Press Secretary Gibbs, “when we say immediately, we mean yesterday.” Of course only 36 hours later the tone changed to one of supporting a smooth transition to a new regime and finding a way for President Mubarak to exit gracefully. The original position seemed to be the height of chutzpah but when America internalized the reality the government’s position seemed to make more sense. But of course, the United States capital sits 5,600 miles from Cairo giving the U.S. administration much less to be concerned about than some of Egypt’s closer neighbors.

In Israel, which has shared a relatively peaceful border with Egypt for the last 32 years, the concerns and, therefore, the reactions were much different. Hosni Mubarak, while no great friend of Israel, could certainly be depended upon to maintain the peace treaty and maintain a modicum of civility with his neighbor to the northeast. True, except for attending the funeral of former Prime Minister Rabin of blessed memory, Mubarak never made a visit to Israel always saying that the time was not ripe for such a visit. But our soldiers were not dying on that border and we were able to redirect our security efforts to those borders where every so often we would be embroiled in conflict.

So the concerns here were understandable. It was and remains in our best interests to make sure that whoever comes to power in Egypt will hold to the 1979 peace agreement. It was natural for our leadership to hope that some way could be worked out for Mubarak to remain, if even only for the period during which a new government would take over, in an effort to keep that border situation stable. So, at least as far as the press has reported, our government here used whatever influence it had with the U.S. and its European associates to urge that a way be found for him to remain during any interim period.

As it turned out the street in Egypt was demanding, the demands were made, more or less, peaceably, the message was clear and the new Egyptian Vice-President along with the military had no choice but to accede to the will of the people and convince the President to step down. In retrospect, it all seems rather logical does it not? I actually thought so as well and, therefore, did not see the need to comment.

However, during this period each day I am reading dispatches from both Tom Friedman and Roger Cohen, which appear regularly in the New York Times’ on line edition as well as in the International Herald Tribune whose print edition is published here as well. No surprises there either. Roger Cohen never misses an opportunity to weave the Palestinian-Israel equation into every op-ed even though, in this situation, the revolution was an internal issue for Egyptians vis-à-vis their government, and there was almost no mention made of outside issues. As for Tom Friedman, he attempts to be more balanced, more analytical and is generally closer to the mark……until this morning.

In today’s piece entitled “Postcard from Cairo, Part 2” he lambasts the Government of Israel for choosing the wrong side. He says:

I am more worried today about Israel’s future than I have ever been, because I think that at time of great change in this region – and we have just seen the beginnings of – Israel today has the most out-of-touch, in-bred, unimaginative and cliché-driven cabinet it has ever had.

And why does he take that position? He goes on:

Rather than even listening to what the democracy youth in Tahrir Square were saying and then trying to digest what it meant, this Israeli government took two approaches during the last three weeks: Frantically calling the White House and telling the president he must not abandon Pharoah – to the point where the White House was thoroughly disgusted with its Israeli interlocutors – and using the opportunity to score propaganda points: “Look at us! Look at us! We told you so! We are the only stable country in the region, because we are the only democracy.”

Was that a bad thing for Israel to do? I don’t think so at all. Later in his piece he says that the only person who “got it” here was Natan Sharansky whose 3 page interview in last Friday’s Jerusalem Post contained the statement “that partnerships with dictatorships are unsustainable – that people cannot permanently be repressed, that they will push for freedom the moment they sense some weakness in their tyrannical leadership.”

Sharansky, of course, speaks from personal experience and is correct. But Friedman conveniently chooses not to reference another remark that Sharansky made in that same interview when he said we are a small country with limited resources and if our defense forces are not always at the ready for any eventuality we could lose this country in a day.

What is it about people like Friedman and Cohen that prevents them from “getting” that? Very simply, they do not live here and that gives them a point of reference so very different from those of us who have, indeed, chosen to live here. For us, every decision is potentially the last one we will ever make, if it is wrong. For us, there is no 5,600 mile buffer between us and them. For us, every chance we take can result in that being the last chance we ever take.

So those of us who live here and have chosen to cast our lot with the people if Israel in the land of Israel, have a right and even an obligation to consider, first and foremost, what we think is best for us, just as every other country’s leadership worldwide must do as well. In retrospect perhaps it was the wrong decision to make and now that the die of change is cast in Egypt, for sure we will need to embrace the new leadership and encourage both dialogue and understanding. But we pay the price for our wrong decisions, not Tom Friedman and not Roger Cohen, however well-intentioned they may be. Until the time comes when they are prepared to take the same risks as those of us here, the better part of valor would be to for them to keep their mouths shut.